State of Nation October 2005

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Wanted: a credible opposition

by Mark Percival
October 2005


If PSD leader Mircea Geoana was serious about his "revolution of good" he would begin an inquest	into the business dealings of his PSD colleague, the Senate leader Nicolae Vacaroiu.

Nine months into the Tariceanu administration, the cracks are clearly beginning to show, with President Traian Basescu becoming increasingly open in his criticism of the government, even referring to its weaknesses on his recent trip to the United States for the meeting of world leaders at the UN. Meanwhile differences between members of the coalition and within the two main Alliance parties themselves have made the present administration begin to show disturbing similarities with that of Victor Ciorbea, who took office in November 1996 after the victory of the centre right Democratic Convention under President Emil Constantinescu. In spite of making some significant economic reforms in its early stages, Ciorbea’s government is remembered mainly for its mediocrity and political infighting.

Similarly, members of today’s ruling coalition are now at odds over a whole range of issues, the recent contradictory declarations on the proposed rise in VAT being merely one example, with clear economic decision making falling victim to political infighting. The status of judicial reform is looking increasingly uncertain after the government backed away from appealing to the electorate to support Justice Minister Monica Macovei’s policies, and meanwhile the European Commission continues to point to the lack of progress in this critical area. Health reform, another vital issue, has been almost non-existent, with many experts saying the position in this sector has actually deteriorated in the first six months of this government. Teachers opened the start of the new school year with a series of protests, which is hardly surprising since last autumn when in opposition the Alliance promised to double their salaries as well as develop ambitious plans for computerisation of schools and other improvements in the sector. The government seems nowhere near to respecting these commitments.

By all objective criteria, the Tariceanu administration should now be getting a rough ride for failing to respect the promises on which it was elected. The difficulty in Romania, however, where major political parties based on real ideology do not exist, is that there is no credible opposition. The antics of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) certainly provide amusement. Adrian Nastase recently made lamentable efforts to look “cool” by being photographed playing the guitar at a meeting of the “Young Social Democrats” a group of social climbers with no real interest in politics, who nevertheless adopted Che Guavara as their emblem in an effort to connect themselves with student radicals of the 1970s, for whom a wall poster of the South American leftist was obligatory. Equally, party president Mircea Geoana has now proclaimed a “revolution of good” under which the PSD aims to transform Romania’s political class, while at the same time his party defends the continued presence of Nicolae Vacaroiu as head of the Senate, in spite of numerous allegations of massive corruption which have never been brought to trial due to the politician’s parliamentary immunity. Constitutionally, Vacaroiu is the second most important political figure in the country, who would become temporary head of state should any mishap befall Basescu.

The lack of credibility in the opposition is re-emphasised by the fact that former president Ion Iliescu continues to steal the limelight, in spite of his defeat by Mircea Geoana in the election for the PSD presidency earlier in the year. The former head of state has now launched a so-called “social platform” along with Petre Roman, who was a founding member with Iliescu of the post December 1989 National Salvation Front. Roman served as Prime Minister from then until September 1991, when he was ousted by a miners’ invasion of Bucharest, leading to a long running political feud between the two. Now, Iliescu and Roman have patched up their differences, and some ironic commentators have even dubbed the new political force “Front for the Second National Salvation.”

So far the new organisation has not registered as a political party, a move which reflects Iliescu’s extraordinary cunning. By describing it as a “social platform” he is less obviously challenging the PSD. It will consequently be much easier to recruit leading PSD figures, from among the still considerable pro-Iliescu elements that hold prominent positions within the party. The former head of state need not formally break from the PSD for the time being, but could maintain a semi-detached status, only involving himself in the party’s affairs when it suits his purposes, appearing from time to time in the role of elder statesman, while leaving Geoana to get his hands dirty in the day to day business of attacking the government.

Iliescu’s long term plan could be to develop the “social platform” for about one or two years, before launching a new leftist party in late 2006 or early 2007, which would allow enough time to develop it into a serious political force for the next parliamentary elections in 2008, unless an early poll upsets the calendar. If Romania accedes to the EU on 1 January 2007, such a party could also tap into the inevitable wave of disappointment once Romanians realise that their standard of living has not improved, perhaps allowing Iliescu to draw on some of his old leftist nationalism, reflected in the early 1990s by the National Salvation Front’s slogan “We will not sell the country.” Even though Iliescu himself is constitutionally barred from standing for President in 2008, after already serving two and a half terms, he will aim to be the real power behind Roman, or whatever candidate such a new party will put up for the job.

Iliescu’s remarkable political longevity is due to three main reasons. Firstly, he is one of the few Romanian politicians with a clearly identifiable set of beliefs. The fact that these are rooted on the left means he can appeal to a substantial electorate of the disillusioned, who have lost out from Romania’s transition period and who hark back to the old certainties of the communist regime. Iliescu’s lack of substantial wealth and his affability on a personal level have helped enhance his popularity with this segment of the country’s citizens, even though in practice he presided over a system which allowed vast fortunes to be made by those close to him, and under which Romania became an increasingly brutal, materialistic and divided society.

Secondly, Iliescu survives because politics is his passion. Unlike much of the country’s political class, who envisage holding office for a limited period to get rich, the former president thrives on the political manipulation he learned under communism, while being strengthened by his lack of direct involvement in major financial scandal. Thirdly, Iliescu’s close connections with the state apparatus, including the intelligence services, have given him an unparalleled knowledge base to use against his political opponents. The former president and his anointed successors will consequently continue to be prominent until enough new political leaders, untainted by scandal and with an equally passionate commitment to reform, begin to establish themselves to create a real opposition to the current administration.